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Abstract
We analyze a network formation model where agents belong to diﬀerent communities. Both
individual beneﬁts and costs depend on direct as well as indirect connections. Beneﬁts of an
indirect connection decrease with distance in the network while the cost of a link depends on the
type of agents involved. Two individuals from the same community always face a low linking cost
and the cost of forming a relationship for two individuals of diﬀerent communities diminishes
with the rate of exposure of each of them to the other community. We derive a number of results
with regard to equilibrium networks. In particular, socialization among the same type of agents
can be weak even if the within-type link cost is very low and oppositional identity patterns can
arise for a wide range of parameters. Our model also suggests that policies aiming at reducing
segregation are socially desirable only if they reduce the within-community cost diﬀerential by
as u ﬃciently large amount.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The concept of identity has been analyzed for decades in philosophy, psychology, and sociology
(see, e.g. Abrams and Hogg, 1999). It is, however, only recently that it has captured the attention
of economists. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) were the ﬁrst to introduce identity into the neoclassical
utility maximizing framework in an analysis that draws directly from social psychology.1
In the present paper, we adopt a diﬀerent but related view of identity by highlighting the
importance of the exposure to the other group in the friendship formation process between individ-
uals of diﬀerent ethnic groups. The main novelty in our network formation model is that linking
decisions determine the endogenous costs and beneﬁts of individual exposure and identiﬁcation to
other communities.
Motivation. Part of the literature has visualized the concept of identity as unidimensional.
In other words, individuals with a stronger identiﬁcation to their own group are usually assumed
to have a weaker identiﬁcation to the other group. Identiﬁcations with own and other cultures
are treated as mutually exclusive. This has usually been studied in societies where a majority
and a minority culture coexist. Those who adopt this view consider that ethnic minorities either
remain persistent and loyal to their inherited ethnicity or assimilate to the ethnic environment of
the majority group. This can lead to the phenomenon of oppositional identities, where some ethnic
minorities reject the majority behavioral norms while others totally assimilate to it (Ainsworth-
Darnell and Downey, 1998). For example, studies in the US (and also in the UK) have found that
A f r i c a nA m e r i c a ns t u d e n t si np o o ra r e a sm a yb ea mbivalent about learning standard English and
performing well at school because this may be regarded as “acting white” (Fordham and Ogbu,
1986; Wilson, 1987; Delpit, 1995; Ogbu, 2003; Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005; Selod and Zenou,
2006; Battu et al., 2007; Fryer and Torelli, 2010; Battu and Zenou, 2010).2
There is a literature in psychology (see, in particular, Phinney, 1990; Berry, 1997; Ryder et
al., 2000) that proposes a broader concept of self-identiﬁcation in a two-dimensional framework,
where identiﬁcations with two diﬀerent cultures are not necessary mutually exclusive. Berry (1997)
presents four distinct strategies for how individuals relate to two cultures. Assimilation is a weak
1For an overview of the literature on the economics of identity, see Kirman and Teschl (2004) and Akerlof and
Kranton (2010).
2There are few theoretical models that try to explain oppositional identity behaviors. Austen-Smith and Fryer
(2005) model the trade oﬀ experienced by black individuals by putting forward the tension they face between signalling
their type to the outside labor market and signalling their type to their peers. Indeed signals that induce high wages
can be signals that induce peer rejection. Battu et al. (2007) highlight another trade oﬀ faced by blacks. On the one
hand, they want to interact with other blacks and thus to reject the white’s norm. On the other, they also want to be
friends with whites because the latter possess a better quality social network. They ﬁnd that black workers can end
up choosing oppositional identities if their identity is not strong enough or the wage premium of being employed is
high enough. Based on cultural transmission and peer eﬀects, Bisin et al. (2010) develop a dynamic model of identity
formation that explains why ethnic minorities may choose to adopt oppositional identities and why this behavior may
persist over time.
2identiﬁcation with the culture of origin and a strong identiﬁcation with the alternative culture.
Integration is achieved when an individual combines strong dedication to the origin and large
commitment to the other culture. Marginalization is a weak dedication to both cultures. Finally,
separation is an exclusive commitment to the culture of origin. The following ﬁgure summarizes












Figure 1. Diﬀerent identiﬁcations for ethnic minorities
As it can be seen from Figure 1, individuals who are integrated have not only a strong identiﬁca-
tion to the majority culture but also to their own culture. Observe that the concept of oppositional
identity corresponds to either a separated or an assimilated individual in Figure 1.
There are some empirical studies in the US using both the unidimensional and bidimensional
deﬁnition of identity choices. For example, using the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent
Health (AddHealth), Patacchini and Zenou (2006) use the homophily index Hi of individual i
proposed by Coleman (1958) to analyze the exposure of individuals of white and black race to
own and other races. If the homophily index Hi of a student i is equal to 0, it means that the
percentage of same-race friends of this individual equals the share of same-race students in the
school. Negative values of the index imply an underexposure to same race students, while positive
values imply an overexposure to same race students compared to the mean. Figure 2 displays their













































Whites in integrated schools
Figure 2. Distribution of students by share of same-race friends in integrated schools
Most of white students have white friends since roughly 40 percent of them are associated with
values of the homophily index greater than 0.4, denoting a clear deviation from the assumption of
random choice of friends by race. Black students appear to be more heterogenous in their choice of
friends than whites. The clear bimodality in the distribution (corresponding to values of Hi between
−0.6 and −0.8 and between 0.6 and 0.8) reveals that there are, mainly, two types of black students:
those who have mostly white friends and those choosing mostly black friends. In terms of Berry’s
characterization presented above (Figure 1), most white students and some black students show
a separated or integrated identities, while a relevant fraction of black students shows assimilated
identities.3
A model of homogeneous behavior among members of the same groups cannot explain the
pattern obtained in Figure 2. Choices of friends between races need to be consistent with each
other in order for the observed aggregated level of social interactions to show the emergence of
heterogeneous identity patterns. Thus, to understand the observed patterns, the network aspect of
friendships cannot be ignored.
Model and Results. We propose a network formation model that can simultaneously explain
the identity patterns described in Figure 1 and the socialization patterns observed in Figure 2..
We consider a ﬁnite population of individuals composed by two diﬀerent communities. These two
communities are categorized according to some exogenous factor such as, for example, their gender,
race or ethnic and cultural traits. Individuals decide with whom they want to form a link with
according to a utility function that weights the costs and beneﬁts of each connection. This results
in a network of relationships where a link between two diﬀerent individuals represents a friendship
relationship. The utility of each individual depends on the geometry of this friendship network.
To model the beneﬁts and costs of a given network, we consider a variation of the connections
3Marmaros and Sacerdote (2006) show that the main determinants of friendship formation are the geographical
proximity and race. Also Mayer and Puller (2008), using administrative data and information from Facebook.com,
ﬁnd that race is strongly related to social ties, even after controlling for a variety of measures of socioeconomic
background, ability, and college activities.
4model introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), a workhorse model in the analysis of strategic
network formation.4 From the standard connections model, we keep the property that an individual
beneﬁts from her direct and indirect connections, and that this beneﬁt decays with distance in the
network. This can be interpreted as positive externalities derived from information transmission
(of trends and fashion for adolescents, of job oﬀers for workers, etc.). However, in the standard
connections model, each link is equally costly, irrespective of the pair of agents that is connected.
We depart from this assumption as follows.
Consider the case where communities are deﬁned according to ethnicity, which may entail
diﬀerences in language and social norms. When two individuals of diﬀerent communities interact,
they may initially experience a disutility due to the attachment to their original culture. This
discomfort can, however, be mitigated if individuals are frequently exposed to the other community.
Indeed, when someone spends time interacting with people from the other community, she can
learn the codes and norms (prescriptions) that govern their social interactions. This is precisely
the starting point of our analysis: the exposure to another social group decreases the cost of
interacting with individuals from that group.
To be more precise, we assume that the linking cost of a pair of agents belonging to diﬀerent
communities depends on their level of exposure to the other community. We model this feature
through a cost function that positively depends on the fraction of same-type friends each person
has. This cost is, however, never lower than the intracommunity linking cost.
In this respect, social distance expresses the force underlying this cost structure. Two agents
are closer in the social space, the more each of them is exposed to the other community. And, the
closer they are in the social space, the easier it is for them to interact. In our model, this social
distance is endogenous and depends on the respective choice of peers.
We study the shape of stable networks in this setup. We use the notion of pairwise stability,
introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). It is a widespread tool in the strategic analysis of social
and economic networks. It takes into account the individual incentives to create and sever links and
the necessary mutual consent between both sides for a link to be formed. In a nutshell, a network is
pairwise stable if no agent has incentives to sever any of her links, and no pair of agents who are not
connected have incentives to form a new link. In our model, it is a complex combinatorial problem
to fully characterize the set of stable networks. We provide, however, a partial characterization
that conveys information about the diﬀerent identity and socialization patterns that may arise in
equilibrium.
In this context, when intracommunity linking costs are low, we show that oppositional identities
can emerge when intercommunity costs are also low, i.e. the maximum possible cost of an intercom-
munity link is close to the cost of an intracommunity link. In several equilibrium conﬁgurations,
bridge links (i.e. links that connect both communities) prevail. Even if those bridge links can be
4See Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2008) for overviews of the growing literature on social and economic networks.
5quite costly for the agents involved, these links give them direct access to parts of the networks that
would be not accessible otherwise. This reverberates into direct and indirect beneﬁts that overcome
the cost for both sides of the link, and acts as positive externalities for the agents who are in their
respective neighborhoods since the cost of a link is only paid by the individuals directly involved
in it. We can also determine conditions under which totally assimilated and separated minorities
(Figures 1 and 2) can emerge in equilibrium as well as “extreme” networks (i.e. bipartite networks)
where individuals of each community are only connected to individuals from the other community.
The mechanism we suggest links socialization costs with network geometry. Since individual
and aggregate welfares depend on the geometry of the resulting network, we may wonder about
the impact of policies aiming at reducing intercommunity socialization costs. In our context, such
an analysis is diﬃcult to perform due to the inherent multiplicity of stable conﬁgurations. We try,
however, to perform one step in this direction by comparing two extreme outcomes: extremely
integrated and segregated networks. When intracommunity costs are low, we show that social
integration is not always preferred to social segregation. The ineﬃciency comes from the excessive
individual cost paid to build bridge links between communities. This suggests that these types
of policies may only be eﬀective if they substantially reduce intercommunity socialization costs.
We believe that this is an interesting result that may explain part of the relative ineﬃciency of
integration policies such as school busing, forced integration of public housing, and Moving to
Opportunity (MTO) programs implemented in the United States (the latter relocate families from
high- to low-poverty neighborhoods (and from racially segregated to mixed neighborhoods).5 In
our theoretical framework, policies reducing intercommunity socialization costs are not necessarily
going to induce more desirable network structures. For example, activities outside the classroom
for adolescents or cultural activities at the neighborhood level can favor integrated patterns since
they may facilitate interactions among individuals of diﬀerent types, but the outcome is not going
to be socially eﬃcient unless these policies suﬃciently decrease the cost of interactions.
Our model can be extended in a number of directions. We present two diﬀerent possible ex-
tensions in the last section of the paper. First, we introduce heterogeneous payoﬀ externalities. It
might be that agents of one type exert a higher direct positive externality on others than agents
of the other type. This setup can represent, for example, a situation in which one of the two types
has ex ante a higher human and/or social capital.6 Second, we introduce a social punishment
for individuals from the minority group who identify themselves with the majority culture. This
punishment expresses the rejection by the members of her original group who strictly stick to their
social and cultural values. This can be a reduced form representation of the “acting white” phe-
nomenon mentioned above. We show that both situations facilitate the adoption of oppositional
identities.
5See Lang (2007), which gives a very nice overview of these policies in the United States.
6Benabou (1996) studies a location model with two types and heterogeneous human capital externalities with a
similar feature.
6Related Literature. The papers by Currarini et al. (2009, 2010), Bramoullé and Rogers
(2010), and Mele (2010) study homophily in networks using stochastic models of network formation.
The aim in these papers is therefore similar, but there are important diﬀerences with respect to the
methodology. They assume a dynamic and stochastic matching sequence while we study strategic
linking decisions in a one-shot game. The papers by Currarini et al. (2009, 2010) develop a
matching model with a population formed by communities of diﬀerent sizes. They are able to
replicate a number of observations from real-world data related to homophilous behavior at the
aggregate level but, in their model, individuals’ behavior is totally homogeneous among the same
group of agents. Bramoullé and Rogers (2010) depart from Currarini et al. by assuming that
dynamic matching follows the process studied by Jackson and Rogers (2007) and they show that
more connected individuals tend to have a more diverse set of friends.7 Mele (2010) studies a model
where meetings are dynamic and stochastic and each individual involved in a meeting can decide
whether she wants to create or sever the link with the other person. Mele shows that this process
always converges.
The papers by Johnson and Gilles (2000) and Jackson and Rogers (2005) extend the Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996)’s connection model by introducing ex ante heterogeneity in the cost structure.
In the latter model, the cost of creating links between the two communities is exogenous and does
not depend on the behavior of the two agents involved in the connection. In the former model, the
cost of creating a link is proportional to the geographical distance between two individuals and thus
this cost is ﬁxed ex-ante and does not change with the linking decisions of the two agents involved
in the link.8 This turns out to be a key diﬀerence with our cost structure, where the cost of a link
is endogenous and depends on the neighborhood structure of the two agents involved in the link.
Eguia (2010) presents a theory in which the cost of assimilation is endogenous and strategically
chosen by the better-oﬀ group in order to screen those who wish to assimilate. Eguia (2010) shows
that, in equilibrium, only high types who generate positive externalities to the members of the
better-oﬀ group will assimilate. The paper does not focus on network issues and therefore the
results are of a diﬀerent and complementary nature.
Some papers analyze the consequences of homophily in social networks. For example, Buhai
and Van der Leij (2008) develop a social network model of occupational segregation with inbreeding
bias, and Golub and Jackson (2008) study how homophilous networks aﬀect communication and
agents’ beliefs in a dynamic information transmission process.
Finally, Schelling (1971) is a seminal reference when discussing social networks and segregation
patterns. Shelling’s model shows that, even a mild preference for interacting with people from the
same community can lead to large diﬀerences in terms of location decision. Indeed, his results
suggest that total segregation persists even if most of the population is tolerant about heteroge-
7This holds when students are divided according to sex in high-schools in the AddHealth data set.
8Iijima and Kamada (2010) extend the model of Johnson and Gilles (2000) to a multidimensional setting where
individuals care for the exogenous distance of diﬀerent attributes at the same time.
7neous neighborhood composition.9 Our analysis diﬀers from Schelling’s classical framework (and
its diﬀerent extensions) in several directions. First of all, we analyze a network formation game
while in Schelling the network structure is ﬁxed. Secondly, homophilous preferences in our setup
are not homogenous and are endogenous. In particular, these preferences are determined by both
the direct and indirect beneﬁts derived from the creation of a link and by the social environment
of the potential partner. The economic beneﬁts thus depend on the network structure of all the
population.
Our main contribution. Our main contribution is to show that the mechanism of our model
(that relates the cost of friendship to the social distance of two linked individuals) can induce en-
dogenous asymmetric socialization behaviors of a particular, and economically relevant, type. We
assume that socialization costs depend on exposure to other communities and we show that ex
ante identical individuals may end up with very diﬀerent network positions. In particular, sepa-
rated, integrated, marginalized and/or assimilated patterns of friendships ( F i g u r e1 )m a yp r e v a i l
in equilibrium. Thus, we obtain intragroup asymmetric behaviors in connectivity in a number
of equilibrium networks, which allow us to rationalize the friendship patterns observed in Figure
2. We do not mean here that the result of socialization is always going to lead to segregation
and/or oppositional identities, but we are able to show that these patterns can emerge in some
circumstances as the result of a decentralized process of socialization. There are also other possible
equilibria where this would not occur and our direct aim is not to provide a full characterization
of the set of equilibrium networks. Indeed, the pool of high-schools from the AddHealth data set
shows a variety of real-world conﬁgurations. Therefore, it is natural that any model that wants
to give reasonable microfoundations for these conﬁgurations exhibits multiplicity of equilibria. We
endogenously model the structure of the network of friendship relations where not only friends,
but friends of friends, and friends of friends of friends, etc. matter. Because of this feature, a
problem of a combinatorial nature, also present in the classical model of Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996), emerges.10 This is why it is extremely hard, if not impossible, to provide a full-ﬂedged
characterization of all possible stable networks.11
9This framework has been modiﬁe da n de x t e n d e di nd i ﬀerent directions, exploring, in particular, the stability and
robustness of this extreme outcome (see, for example, Mobius, 2007 or Zhang, 2004).
10It is indeed well-known that non-cooperative games of network formation with nominal lists of intended links are
plagued by coordination problems (Myerson, 1991; Jackson, 2008; Cabrales et al., 2011). Cooperative-like stability
concepts solve them partially, but heavy combinatorial costs still jeopardize a full characterization.
11The existence of a plethora of equilibria in our framework is not the result of the use of a weak stability concept
(in our case, pairwise stability). The use of an stronger equilibrium concept in network formation games, such as
Pairwise Nash equilibria, does not seem to signiﬁcantly reduce the number of equilibria: in a slightly perturbed
version of the present model, we are able to show that the set of pairwise stable equilibria and the set of pairwise
Nash equilibria coincide. This is available upon request.
82 The model
2.1 Individuals, communities, and networks
There is a ﬁnite population of individuals denoted by N = {1,...,n}. This population is divided
into two communities, the Blue and the Green communities. Each agent belongs exclusively to
one of the two communities, B or G. This initial endowment of each individual can be interpreted,
for example, as the identity inherited from her family. The type of individual i is denoted by
τ (i) ∈ {B,G}.L e t nB denote the number of B individuals in the population. Similarly, let nG
denote the number of G individuals in the population. We have that n = nB + nG. We assume,
without loss of generality, that nB ≤ nG.
Individuals will be connected through a social network structure. A network is represented
by a graph, where each node represents an individual and a connection among nodes represents
a friendship relationship between the two individuals involved. We denote a network by g,a n d
gij =1if i is friend with j and gij =0otherwise. In our framework, friendship relationships
are taken to be reciprocal, i.e. gij = gji so that graphs/networks are undirected.W e d e n o t e
the link of two connected individuals, i and j,b yij.T h e s e t o f i’s direct contacts is: Ni(g)=
{j 6= i | gij =1 },w h i c hi so fs i z eni(g). The direct contacts of individual i of the same type is
N
τ(i)
i (g)={j 6= i,τ(i)=τ(j) | gij =1 }, and we denote the cardinality of this set by n
τ(i)
i (g).
We present some examples of network conﬁgurations. The circle is such that each agent has two
direct contacts. The star-shaped network has one central agent who is in direct contact with all the
other peripheral agents who, in turn, are only connected to this central agent. The complete network
is such that each agent is in direct relationship with every other agents so that each individual i
has n − 1 direct contacts.
Figure 3. Circle, star and complete networks with four individuals.
A network is depicted as a set of colored nodes (Figure 3), which allows to distinguish among
members of diﬀerent groups, and links that connect some or all of them. Naturally, blue nodes
refer to type−B individuals while green nodes indicate type−G individuals.
9T h ec i r c l ea n dt h ec o m p l e t en e t w o r ka r ee x a m p l e so fr e g u l a rc o n ﬁgurations in which all agents
share a similar position, though they diﬀer by the number of connections each agents possesses.
The star is an example of centralized, asymmetric, network structure, where the center occupies a
very diﬀerent position than the rest of the other individuals in the network.
We still need to introduce some more concepts associated to the connectivity of the network.
There is a path in network g from individual i to individual j if there exists an ordered set of
individuals, with i being the ﬁrst one and j being the last one, such that each agent is connected
to the following one according to this order.12 Graphically, there is a path from individual i to
individual j whenever one can travel from i to j through the links of the network. The length of a
path is the number of links involved in it. The shortest path between from i to j is the path that
involves the lowest number of links. We deﬁne the geodesic distance (or simply distance) between
individuals i and j as the length of the shortest path that connects them, and we denote it by
d(i,j). If in a given network there does not exist any path that connects individuals i and j we
say that the distance between them is inﬁnite, and d(i,j)=∞. For example, in a star-shaped
network any two diﬀerent agents in the periphery are connected by a path of distance two. Since
there is no other shorter path that connects these two peripheral agents, the distance among them
in the network is equal to two. Finally, we say that a link among individuals i and j is a bridge
link whenever these two individuals are of diﬀerent types. Formally, the link ij is a bridge link if
τ (i) 6= τ (j). Bridge links are the ones that connect both communities.
2.2 Preferences
The utility function of each individual i,d e n o t e db yui(g), depends on the network structure that








where 0 ≤ δ<1 is the beneﬁtf r o ml i n k s ,d(i,j),t h egeodesic distance between individuals i and
j,a n dcij > 0 is the cost for individual i of maintaining a direct link with j.
The utility function (1) has the general structure of the so-called connections model, introduced
by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Links represent friendship relationships between individuals and
involve some costs. A “friend of a friend” also results in some indirect beneﬁts, although of a lesser
value than the direct beneﬁts that come from a “friend”. The same is true of “friends of a friend of
a friend,” and so forth. The beneﬁt deteriorates in the geodesic distance of the relationship. This
is represented by a factor δ that lies between 0 and 1, which indicates the beneﬁt from a direct
relationship between i and j, and is raised to higher powers for more distant relationships. For
12Formally, a path p
k
ij of length k from i to j in the network g is a sequence hi0,i 1,...,iki of players such that i0 = i,
ik = j, ip 6= ip+1,a n dgipip+1 =1 , for all 0 ≤ p ≤ k −1, that is, players ip and ip+1 are directly linked in g.I fs u c ha
path exists, then individuals i and j are path-connected.
10instance, in the network described in Figure 4, individual 1 obtains a beneﬁto f2δ from the direct
connections with individuals 2 and 3, an indirect beneﬁto fδ2 from the indirect connection with
individual 4, and an indirect beneﬁto f2δ3 from the indirect connection with individuals 5 and 6.
Since δ<1, this leads to a lower beneﬁt of an indirect connection than of a direct one.
Figure 4. A bridge network.
However, individuals only pay costs cij > 0 for maintaining their direct relationships. This
is where our model becomes very diﬀerent from the standard connections model. To characterize
linking costs, we need ﬁrst to introduce one more concept. Given a network g,w ed e ﬁne the rate











i (g) measures the fraction of same-type friends since n
τ(i)
i (g) is the number of i’s same-
type friends in network g while ni(g) is the total number of i’s friends in network g, independently
of their type. The reason why we substract a 1 in the denominator will become apparent in the
next paragraphs.









j (g)C if τ(i) 6= τ(j)
(3)
There are thus diﬀerent costs, depending with whom a connection is made. Since C>0 and
rate of exposures are non-negative, the main feature of this cost structure is that it is always more
costly to form a friendship relationship with someone from the other community (the cost is given by
(3)) than with someone from the same community (which cost is c). In particular, if an individual
i of type τ(i) forms a friendship relationship with an individual j of type τ(j),w i t hτ(i) 6= τ(j)
(i.e. intercommunity friendship formation), then the cost is increasing in their respective rates of
exposure to their own communities. If, for example, a green person has only green friends, then
it will be diﬃcult for her to interact with a blue person, especially if the latter has mostly blue
11friends. There are diﬀerent cultures, norms and habits between communities so that frictions are
higher the more diﬀerent people are. If we interpret “type” by “race” so that “blue” and “green”
are replaced by “black” and “white”, then (3) means that it is always easier for blacks to interact
with other blacks and likewise for whites, and that the interracial relationships strongly depend on
how “exposed” individuals are, i.e. how many same-race friends they have. These diﬃculties in
interracial relationships can be due to languages issues13 or more generally to diﬀerent social norms
and cultures.14,15
What we have in mind here is that individuals are born with a certain type τ (blue or green)
that aﬀects their easiness to interact with other individuals. It is assumed that it is less costly
to interact with someone of the same type than of a diﬀerent type. So from this initial trait τ,
there are natural gaps and diﬀerences between communities of types. But people make choices in
terms of friendships, and that can be interpreted in terms of identity. These choices can increase
or decrease the original gap between individuals. If someone who is born blue chooses to have only
blue friends (this is an identity choice), then it will be more diﬃcult for her to interact with a green
person. However, the more similar the choices are, the easier it is to interact with someone from
ad i ﬀerent type. Observe that we allow that friend choices can totally erase the initial cost gap
between a blue type and a green type. Indeed, if at least one individual (i or j) has no friends of




j =0 ), then it is equally costly for them to interact with each
other than with someone of same type (i.e. the cost is c in both cases).16
The reason why we substract a 1 in the denominator in the deﬁnition of the rate of exposure
(see (2)) is because, when we compute the cost of a given bridge link between communities, we do
not include this bridge link in the computation of the cost. What is relevant for the cost is the
rate of exposure according to the rest of connections of each of the two individuals involved in the
13For example, the studies of Labov (1972), Baugh (1983), and Labov and Harris (1986) reveal that Black English
of diﬀerent metropolitan areas has converged, while it has been simultaneously diverging from Standard American
English. This creates some costs in the interactions between blacks and whites.
14Camargo et al. (2010) show in a randomized experiment that whites who are randomly assigned black roommates
have in the future a signiﬁcantly larger proportion of black friends than white students who are randomly assigned
white roommates. Ben-Ner et al. (2009) show in lab experiments that the distinction between in-group and out-group
aﬀects signiﬁcantly economic and social behavior, for example, in forming working relationships.
15Lemanski (2007) documents an interesting experiment in post-apartheid urban South Africa by examining the
lives of those already living in desegregated spaces. She studies the case a low-cost state-assisted housing project
situated in the wealthy southern suburbs of Cape Town. In this social housing project, named Westlake village,
colored and Black African (alongside a handful of white and Indian) residents were awarded state housing in 1999 as
replacement for their previous homes, which were demolished to make way for a mixed land-use development. She
ﬁnd that diﬀerent races are not only living peacefully in shared physical space but also actively mixing in social,
economic and to a lesser extent political and cultural spaces. Furthermore, residents have largely overcome apartheid
histories and geographies to develop new localized identities. This can be another indication that when people from
diﬀerent races or cultures interact with each other the costs of further interacting decreases.
16In Appendix B, we investigate a diﬀerent cost function where the intercommunity cost is not anymore equal to
the intracommunity even if one of the persons involved in a relationship has no friends of the same type.
12bridge link.
To illustrate our cost function (3), consider again the network described in Figure 4 and assume
that individuals 1, 2, and 3 are greens (type G) while individuals 4, 5, and 6 are blues (type B).
Imagine that individuals 3 and 4 are not yet connected and individual 3 considers the possibility
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4 (g)=2(number of same-type friends of 3 and 4, respectively) and n3 (g)=
n4 (g)=3(total number of 3’s and 4’s friends independently of type, considering also the link
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4 (g)=2 /3. It would be less costly for individual 3 (green) to be friend
to individual 4 (blue) in this situation because the latter has already a green friend.
With the above notation, we want to highlight that costs, in particular intercommunity costs,
depend on the network structure. However, from now on, and to minimize notational burden, we
will not make the dependency of the rates of exposure and the linking costs on g explicit.
2.3 Network stability
In games played on a network, individuals payoﬀs depend on the network structure. In our case,
this dependency is established in expression (1), that encompasses both the beneﬁts and costs
attributed to an individual given her position in the network of relationships. Any equilibrium
notion introduces some stability requirements. The notion of pairwise-stability, introduced by
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), provides a widely used solution concept in networked environments.
Let us now deﬁne this concept.
Deﬁnition 1 An e t w o r kg is pairwise stable if and only if:
(i) for all ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij) and uj(g) ≥ uj(g − ij)
(ii) for all ij / ∈ g,i fui (g) <u i (g + ij) then uj (g) >u j (g + ij).
17Observe that, when individual 3 considers the possibility of creating a link with individual 4,i n d i v i d u a l3 does
not take into account the possible link between 3 and 4 when calculating the percentage of same-race friends of herself
and of 4.
13In words, a network is pairwise-stable if (i) no player gains by cutting an existing link, and (ii)
no two players not yet connected both gain by creating a direct link with each other. Pairwise-
stability thus only checks for one-link deviations.18 It requires that any mutually beneﬁcial link be
formed at equilibrium but does not allow for multi-link severance.
We will use throughout this equilibrium concept. Thus, network g is an equilibrium network
whenever it is pairwise stable.
3S t a b l e n e t w o r k s
3.1 Low intra-community costs
We start the analysis of stable networks with the case of low intra-community costs c. In particular,
we start assuming that c<δ−δ2. If there were only one community (i.e. only one type of individ-
uals), then the complete network would be the unique equilibrium network (as in the connections
model of Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). But, since we have two diﬀerent communities and diﬀerent
cost structures, this is not anymore true. Indeed, an individual of one type may decide to lower
the exposure to her own community in order to become more attractive to the other one. We start
this section by trying to understand under which conditions this may not happen so that we can
still obtain fully intraconnected communities.
We use the following deﬁnitions: A network displays complete integration when both commu-
nities are completely connected, complete segregation when both communities are isolated and
partial integration in any other case. We have the following result:19
Proposition 1 Assume
c<δ− δ2 (4)
so that that each community is fully intraconnected. Then,
(i) T h en e t w o r ks u c ht h a tt h eb l u ea n dt h eg r e e nc o m m u n i t i e sa r ecompletely integrated is an
equilibrium network if and only if
C ≤
(n − 2)
2 (n − 3)
nG (nG − 1)
2
¡








δ2 − c (6)
holds, then the network for which the blue and the green communities are completely seg-
regated is an equilibrium network.
18This weak equilibrium concept is often interpreted as a necessary conditions for stronger stability concepts.
19All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
14To interpret these results, it is useful to think about two diﬀerent eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect, which
we refer to as the connections eﬀect, expresses the role of the direct and indirect gains and losses
of forming or severing a link. This ﬁrst eﬀect is also present in the connections model of Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996). There is, however, a second eﬀect, that we refer to as the exposure eﬀect,
w h i c hi sn e w .T h i se ﬀect is due to the fact that the formation a new link aﬀects the exposure rates
of the individuals involved in it. Indeed, if the new link is between two individuals from diﬀerent
communities (the same community), then the rate of exposure of each of these individuals to their
own community is going to decrease (increase) and thus their intercommunity costs will decrease
(increase). This indirect exposure eﬀect is positive (negative).
As a result, the completely integrated network is going to be stable if the sum of the connections
and the exposure eﬀects for any link is positive. Consider an intercommunity link. The connections
eﬀect is ambiguous because the cost of keeping the link for each individual is strictly large than
c since their rates of exposure to their own communities are strictly positive. However, severing
such a link has an strong and negative exposure eﬀect since it increases both their rate of exposure
and the intercommunity costs with the rest of their friends. Some algebra shows that this second
(exposure) eﬀect always dominates the connections eﬀect and, hence, nobody has incentives to
sever a link. The case of an intracommunity link is less clear. In such a case, the connections eﬀect
is clearly signed: it is positive because we are assuming that δ − δ2 − c>0, which implies that
for two individuals from the same community the beneﬁts of a direct connection compared to an
indirect connection of distance two always outweigh the costs of forming such a link. However,
keeping such link has a negative exposure eﬀect: it increases their respective rates of exposure to
their own communities, and therefore the costs of their intercommunity links become larger. If C
is suﬃciently large, then the negative exposure eﬀect dominates the positive connections eﬀect and
we end up with a stable completely integrated network (see (5)).
The completely segregated network arises when the connections eﬀect of an intercommunity
link is negative. Condition (6) is precisely the mathematical formulation of this negative eﬀect.
Note that, in this case, there are no exposure eﬀects to consider since we start from a situation
where there are no intercommunity links.
If we now use the two-dimensional deﬁnition of identity, illustrated in Figure 1, the blues
and greens are here separated. This could be a case where the two populations are physically
separated (i.e. spatially segregated) so that interactions are very costly (because, for example, of
commuting costs, prejudices, etc.). Intuitively, if C decreases, individuals may start forming bridge
links. These links may make them more attractive, because of the exposure eﬀects, to the other
community members, who, in turn, form bridge links, etc. Let us investigate in more details this
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15The following proposition characterizes some partially integrated equilibrium networks, and bring
into the picture a third important component in the stability of a network geometry:


















holds, then the network where both communities are fully intraconnected and where there is
o n l yo n eb r i d g el i n ki sa ne q u i l i b r i u mn e t w o r k( F i g u r e5 ) .
(ii) If
nGnB ¡
δ − δ2 − c
¢
(nG − 1)(nB − 1) − nB <C<δ− δ3 − c (8)
holds, then the network where both communities are fully intraconnected and each blue indi-
vidual has one, and only one, bridge link and where each green individual has at most one
bridge link is an equilibrium network (Figure 6).
(iii) If
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holds, then the network in which both communities are fully intraconnected and only one blue
agent connects with the green community by linking to all green individuals is an equilibrium
(Figure 7).
In these equilibrium conﬁgurations some integration between blues and greens is taking place.
The following ﬁgures provide a graphical representation.
Figure 5. Equilibrium network when condition (7) holds.
16Figure 6. Equilibrium network when condition (8) holds.
Figure 7. Oppositional identities when c<δ− δ2.
As before, both connections and exposure eﬀects are present in explaining the results of Propo-
sition 2. There is, however, a third component that becomes more relevant here: the requirement
of mutual consent for the link to be formed. When the intercommunity costs of forming a link are
relatively large, i.e. C is high, the network in Figure 5 is pairwise stable because the connections
eﬀect for the agents involved in the only bridge link between communities is positive while the
connections eﬀect of any other intercommunity link is negative for at least one of the two sides of
each of these potential links.20
When C decreases slightly, individuals from diﬀerent communities may now want to create
one of these missing links. This is illustrated in Figure 6. While the direct beneﬁts of a such
20The two individuals involved in this bridge link enjoy a singular position in the network. Some literature in
sociology has highlighted the importance of these type of links in terms of social capital: it is important that bridges
exist between communities. Indeed, social capital is created by a network in which people can broker connections
between otherwise disconnected segments (Granovetter, 1973, 1974; Burt, 1992). We can say that the people who are
bridging two communities are sitting in a structural hole of the network. A structural hole exists when there is only
a weak connection between two clusters of densely connected people (Burt, 1992; Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2007).
17new connection have not changed, the costs are now reduced and, as a result, the sign of the
connections eﬀe c to fs u c han e wl i n ki sr e v e r s e .I nb o t hn e t w o r k sd e s c r i b e di n nF i g u r e s5a n d6 ,t h e
exposure eﬀects play no role since each of the agents is involved in at most one link and the cost of
this link is kept constant when there are changes in the connections within the community (these
intracommunity links do not change the rate of exposure of individuals, which remains maximal
and equals to 1, according to the deﬁnition of rate of exposure given in (2)).
The logic behind the stability of the network displayed in Figure 7 is diﬀerent since it strongly
relies on the exposure eﬀect. The Bm blue individual invests in a large number of intercommunity
links in order to decrease enough her own rate of exposure, and thus to decrease her own cost of
each of these connections. This, in turn, make it cheaper for each green individual to connect to
her and win direct access to the blue community.
To understand our results, let us summarize the three main forces at work:
(1) Individuals want to form connections to obtain direct and indirect beneﬁts. In a disperse
network, connecting to a member of a diﬀerent community usually gives access to many opportu-
nities. This is the connections eﬀect.
(2) Because links are costly, individuals become more attractive the more they are friends with
individuals from the other community and hence can form new links more easily with the other
community. This is the exposure eﬀect.
(3) There is a coordination problem because the creation of a link needs the consent of both
individuals. Condition (i)i nD e ﬁnition 1 of pairwise stability highlight this mutual consent eﬀect.
Equilibrium networks are those that correctly balance these three forces at the individual level.
The equilibrium networks characterized in Proposition 1 and 2 provide some understanding on
how these three eﬀects interact with each other. Contrary to the literature on segregation (e.g.
Schelling, 1971; Benabou, 1993) and on friendship formation (Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005; Battu
et al., 2007), it is important to observe that both the individual location and the structure of the
network are here crucial to understand the equilibrium outcomes. Indeed, not only beneﬁts but
costs are aﬀected by individual’s location and the structure of the network. For example, two
identical blue individuals who have diﬀerent positions in the network may have diﬀerent incentives
to form a link with a green person so that, in equilibrium, only one of them will ﬁnd it beneﬁcial
to form a bridge link.
L e tu sn o wi n v e s t i g a t et h ei s s u eo fassimilation and oppositional identities. The completely
integrated network in Proposition 1 provides a ﬁrst example of how our model can generate some
assimilation patterns. For example, blue individuals partially assimilate to the green community
because each blue individual interacts more often with green individuals than with blue individuals.
However, in such a case the reason mostly relies on the diﬀerence in size of both communities. A
more interesting and richer example is the network displayed in Figure 7. Here, the three eﬀects
mentioned above play a role to generate the assimilation pattern of individual Bm. Assimilation
18arises because the exposure eﬀect of Bm (blue) individual increases the magnitude of the connections
eﬀect for each of the green individuals, which, in turn, induces mutual consent.
With regard to individual welfare, it is not always true that oppositional blue individuals obtain
a higher utility than non-oppositional blues. Take, for example, Proposition 2 (iii) (Figure 7). The
equilibrium utility of the oppositional blue Bm is






















This inequality is not incompatible with the condition given in Proposition 2 (iii), meaning that
both cases, UBm >U B0 and UBm <U B0, are possible. However, if δ is high enough or C or c low
enough, then oppositional individuals will be better oﬀ. Indeed, on the beneﬁt side, because greens
are more numerous, being connected to them give a higher utility to Bm. On the cost side, when
C is too high, then Bm is worse oﬀ because it is very costly for her to be friend with all the green
community. Yet, stability conditions show that, even if these links are costly, she is not interested
in severing anyone of these bridge links because the beneﬁts she derives from each of them, due
to both the connections and the exposure eﬀects, is larger than the cost of keeping one such link
active.
A common feature of all equilibrium networks we have characterized so far is that both com-
munities are fully intraconnected. This obviously limits the type of assimilation and identiﬁcation
patterns we could derive. Now, while we still assume very low intra-community costs, i.e. c<δ−δ2,
we are going to show that, contrary to the standard connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996), in equilibrium, communities can be not fully connected and that both oppositional identities
and integration can arise. The following proposition characterizes an extreme form of assimilation.












then the network described in Figure 8, where not fully intraconnected communities prevail and
where one blue is assimilated and has an oppositional identity while all other blues are separated,
is pairwise stable.
19Figure 8. Oppositional identities with non-fully intraconnected communities.
While the condition δ − δ2 − c>0 would always induce fully intraconnected communities in a
standard connections model, here, it is not the ca s es i n c et h eb l u ec o m m u n i t yi sf r a g m e n t e d .T h e
logic behind this result is similar to the stability result obtained for the network displayed in Figure
7 (see Proposition 2 (iii)) but in a more extreme form. Indeed, the Bm blue individual now has no
connection at all with her own community to minimize her rate of exposure and to eliminate any
gap in the linking costs with the green community. In a way, this individual fully assimilates to
the green community and becomes a green individual according to her choice of social connections.
This generates an extreme oppositional identity pattern where a low fraction of blue individuals
assimilate with the green community while a majority of blue individuals remain connected only to
their community of origin. This is in line with the aggregate conclusions derived from the AddHealth
data set we mention in the introduction (see Figure 2). Our proposed mechanism provides a
rationale for individual friendship choices. This result highlights the fact that assimilation to the
majority culture (Figure 1) makes it diﬃcult for a blue person to interact with her own group.
In Section 5.2, we further investigate this case by looking at social norms and sanctions where
assimilation to the green culture leads to a rejection from the blue community.
Observe that, in this network (Figure 8), the blue oppositional Bm has always a higher utility
than any other non-oppositional blue B0 since (δ − c)nG > (δ − c)nB. Assimilation with the
majority brings access to more social externalities.
The previous result determines under which condition an oppositional identity pattern can
emerge in equilibrium. Pushing this logic to the extreme, the next result shows that, if C is
suﬃciently large, it is even possible that all agents in an economy show an oppositional identity
pattern.
Proposition 4 Assume (4). If C is suﬃciently large, the bipartite network in which all green
agents are connected to all blue agents, and all blue agents are connected to all green agents is an
equilibrium network (Figure 9).
20In the case of a bipartite network each agent is connected only to the other social group and,
thus, each agent shows an oppositional identity pattern.
Figure 9. Bipartite Network with nW =3and nB =2 .
This network can be sustained in equilibrium because, for an individual of a given type, severing
all links to her own community maximizes the positive exposure eﬀect. A link with an agent of
same type would be detrimental because, while it would be quite inexpensive in direct terms, it
would have a negative counterpart: all links with the agents of the other type would involve a
higher cost due to the increase in the fraction of same-type friends, or alternatively, due to the
decrease in exposure to the other type. In other words, all green agents are “becoming” blues while
all blue agents are “becoming” greens.
3.2 Higher socialization costs
Let us now consider the case when c>δ−δ2 so that it becomes more expensive to form links with
individuals from the same community. In that range of parameters (i.e. δ − δ2 <c<δ ), Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996) have shown that, for each community, a star encompassing all individual is
always a pairwise stable network.21 We thus focus on communities that have a star-shaped form.
Of course, since we are dealing with a diﬀerent cost structure, it is not necessarily true that this
result remains valid. However, we are going to present a family of equilibrium networks in which
intra-group structure always form a star network.
Proposition 5 Assume that






δ2 − c (11)
then two disconnected star-shaped communities is a pairwise equilibrium network (complete
segregation). All blues are separated.
21Observe that it is not necessarily the unique pairwise stable graph.
21(ii) If




δ2 − c (12)
then star-shaped communities connected through their central agents is a pairwise equilibrium
network (partial integration). Some blues are separated and some are integrated but












then star-shaped communities where each peripheral agent has one bridge link with the other
peripheral agent whereas stars have no bridge links is a pairwise equilibrium network (partial
integration). Some blues are separated and some are integrated but none has opposi-
tional identity.
(iv) If
C<δ− δ3 − c (14)
then star-shaped communities where the centers in both communities are connected to each
other and all peripheral agents from both communities are connected to each other is a pairwise
equilibrium network (partial integration). In that case, oppositional identities emerge
in equilibrium and all blues are integrated.
Figure 10 displays the diﬀerent cases of Proposition 5 for nB = nG =3 .
Figure 10. Diﬀerent equilibrium networks when δ − δ2 <c<δ .
These results are quite intuitive and show how a reduction in C leads to more bridge links and
more interactions between communities. Let us explain, for example, why oppositional identities
emerge in case (iv), i.e. why some blues have most of their friends who are blues (but are still
22integrated) and others have most of their friends who are greens (but are still integrated). In
case (iv), each peripheral blue (green) individual has one blue (green) friend (the central agent)
and nG − 1 (nB − 1) green (blue) friends so that their common same-type friend percentage is
e
τ(i)
i =1 /(nτ(i)). This is quite small, especially when the size of the population of each community
is large. As a result, each blue (green) peripheral individual displays a high taste for other-type
friends, which makes them very attractive. On the contrary, the blue (green) central agent has
one green (blue) friend and nB − 1 (nG − 1)b l u e( g r e e n )f r i e n d ss ot h a te
τ(i)
i =( nτ(i) − 1)/nτ(i).
This percentage is very close to 1, which make this central agent less attractive for people from
the other community. It is now easy to understand why we have oppositional identities. Let us
focus on blues. First, peripheral blues do not want to connect to each other because the cost is too
high compared to the beneﬁts i n c ec<δ− δ2 (they are at distance 2 from each other). Second,
peripheral blues do not want to sever a link with one of the nG − 1 peripheral greens because the
latter are all very attractive. Finally, peripheral blues do not want to create a link with a central
green person because she is not very attractive due to her high intercommunity costs and they can
reach him from a peripheral green (distance 2) and obtains δ2. This is why peripheral blues have
most of their friends who are greens. It is now easy to understand why a blue central individual
has most of her friends who are blues. This is due to the fact that she is not attractive (because of
her high exposure to her own community) to the peripheral greens.
It is important to observe that this result is not due to the size of the communities. It is easy
to verify that it still holds if nB = nG = n/2. M o r eg e n e r a l l y ,w ec a ns e eh e r et h a tt h e r ea r e
reinforcing eﬀects because once someone from one community is connected to someone from the
other community, she becomes more attractive to people from the other community because she
costs less in the sense that she is less isolated.
In terms of equilibrium utility, let us study the most interesting case, i.e. (iv). The utility of
the peripheral individual (oppositional) is












while that of the center (non-oppositional) individual is:





























c + δ2 − δ
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As above, this condition is not incompatible with (14) and thus the oppositional individual can
have a higher or lower utility than the non-oppositional one depending on the values of C and δ.
234 Social welfare: Integration versus segregation
We now consider some welfare implications of our model. We have previously focused on how
decentralized linking decisions can lead to diﬀerent social network structures. In particular, our
model naturally leads to multiple equilibria. Our analysis in Proposition 1, for example, shows that
there is a range of parameters in which two extreme outcomes, the complete network (in which
all pair of agents, whatever their types, are connected) and a segregated network (in which only
connections within communities are established) are both stable networks. The former represents
a situation of social integration while the latter represents social segregation.I nt e r m so fe ﬃciency
considerations, one may wonder which of the two outcomes is better from a social viewpoint. We
shed here some light on this issue by showing the most important source of ineﬃciencies in our
model.
We consider a utilitarian perspective, where social welfare is measured by the unweighted sum
of individual utilities. Thus, a network g is socially preferable to another network g0 whenever the
sum of individual utilities in g is higher than the sum of individual utilities in g0,i . e .
P
i ui (g) >
P
i ui (g0).
The following result compares the social welfare of segregated and integrated networks, and
states which one is socially preferable.






≤ (n − 1)
2 (15)
holds, then there exists a threshold e C such that for C ≤ e C,i n t e g r a t i o ni se ﬃcient whereas when
C ≥ e C,s e g r e g a t i o ni se ﬃcient.
This result suggests that, depending on the size of relative social groups, we can not plead for
integrated or segregated socialization patterns ap r i o r i . The possible ineﬃciency of the integrated
network comes from the fact that, for any individual, it is costly to keep all her intercommunity
links. Indeed, stability means that it is suboptimal for her to severe one intracommunity link to
increase the exposure eﬀect, and therefore she is paying a cost that is proportional to C. When C
increases, these costs may overcome the beneﬁts derived from connecting to the other community.
Note that this does not contradict stability: when all the rest of her community is connected to the
other community, it is optimal for her to also connect to the other community. This is because the
exposure rate of any member of the other community, and therefore the cost of directly connecting
with each of them, is low precisely because of these intercommunity connections with the rest of
the group. Yet, from a collective point of view, each community would be better oﬀ in isolation
because the aggregate socialization costs are too large when C lies above the threshold e C.A s a
result, the eﬀects of exposure on costs can explain the possible ineﬃciency of interactions.
24This result allows us to link the cost mechanism we explore in this paper with some policy
issues. In particular, we can extract some preliminary conclusions on the possible (in)eﬀectiveness
of policies that can favor socialization and thus interaction between diﬀerent communities. Policies
that diminish intracommunity socialization costs are not necessarily going to induce more desirable
network structures. For example, activities outside the classroom for adolescents or cultural activ-
ities at the neighborhood level can favor integrated patterns since they may facilitate interactions
among individuals with diﬀerent identities but the outcome is not going to be socially eﬃcient
unless these policies suﬃciently decrease the cost of interactions. While the integrated network can
be sustained in equilibrium, this equilibrium can be socially undesirable because individuals are
exerting an excessive cost to keep their connections with the other community.
5E x t e n s i o n s
In what follows we discuss two possible extensions of the model. In the ﬁr s to n e ,w ep r o v i d ea
brief discussion of the model where beneﬁts from connections are type-dependent. In the second
extension, we discuss how social norms and, in particular, social punishments for deviating from
the social behavior of the rest of the community, can also inﬂuence assimilation and oppositional
identity patterns. The analysis of both situations is far from exhaustive, but in both cases, it gives
good hints on how the diﬀerent eﬀects of the model (the connections and exposure eﬀects, and
mutual consent) are aﬀected by these new assumptions.
5.1 Diﬀerent externalities
We now extend our model by considering diﬀerent beneﬁts from interacting with others. Basically,
if someone (whatever her type) has a link with a green (blue), she obtains a direct beneﬁto fδG
(δB). We also assume the same structure for indirect beneﬁts. For example, if someone is connected
to a green who has a blue friend, then she gets δG + δGδB. The cost structure is exactly as before
and given by (3). The beneﬁt δτ can be interpreted in diﬀerent ways. If, for example, we think of
teenagers in a school, then δτ could represent the human capital of individual i’s parents so that
being friend with someone creates positive externalities in terms of education (see e.g., and Zenou,
2006). If, for example, we think of adults in the labor market, then δτ could represent the exchange
of job information between two connected individuals (see e.g., Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004
and Ioannides and Loury, 2004). As stated above, strong ties are people from the same community
while weak ties are those from the other communities. If greens have a better network than blues,
then, as argued by Granovetter (1973, 1974), (green) weak ties are superior to (blue) strong ties
for providing support in getting a job because closed networks are limited in providing information
about possible jobs. In a close network, everyone knows each other, information is shared and so
potential sources of information are quickly shaken down, the network quickly becomes redundant
25in terms of access to new information. In contrast, Granovetter stresses the strength of weak ties
involving a secondary ring of acquaintances who have contacts with networks outside ego’s network
and therefore oﬀer new sources of information on job opportunities.
We assume that δG >δ B so that there is a higher beneﬁt of interacting with a green than with
a blue individual, i.e. the direct externality green individuals exert on others is larger than the one
exerted by blue individuals. This can be, for example, a representation of externalities in education
between teenagers,22 or diﬀerences in human capital and information, such as access to job oﬀers
in labor markets.
Note that, compared to the previous setting, the assumption of heterogeneous externalities
has no impact on exposure eﬀects. Since the cost of an intercommunity link only depends on the
exposure rates, and not on the level of externalities, the exposure eﬀects, which measure changes on
the costs of connecting with the other community due to the creation of a new link, are unaﬀected.
Any change in the analysis must thus come from mutual consent and the connections eﬀects. To
understand this change and its possible impact on equilibrium networks, we focus our attention on
the network displayed in Figure 8 (and analyzed in Proposition 3).
This network was an equilibrium network when δG = δB = δ and δ − δ2 − c>0. Let us now
consider the case when δG = δ + 1
2∆ and δB = δ − 1
2∆,w h e r e∆ = δG − δB > 0 is measuring
the externality gap between the two communities. If ∆ is small, then, by continuity, the network
in in Figure 8 is still an equilibrium network (as long as C is large enough). Mathematically, this
is because the conditions that determine the stability of this network are linear inequalities. This
linear inequalities are strict,23 and therefore a small perturbation in the values of δG and δB from
the starting point δG = δB = δ preserves the order of all these inequalities. In terms of intuition,
increasing δG has a positive impact of the connections eﬀect for each link the blue individual Bm has
with the green community. In other words, each green individual becomes more attractive because
the cost of connecting to each of them does not change and externalities increase. As a counterpart,
the connections eﬀect is negative for each of the green individuals linked to Bm. Indeed, the blue
individual becomes less attractive because, while the cost of keeping the connection is the same,
the externalities that each green agent receives from this direct link are smaller. Yet, if ∆ is small
enough, this negative eﬀect is too small to discourage a green individual to be friend with Bm:
overall, this link is still valuable.
Things change when ∆ becomes larger. If, in particular, we have that:
δB = δ −
1
2
∆ <c⇔ 2(δ − c) < ∆
then each green individual has incentives to sever the link with the Bm individual. The externality
the green agent receives from the link is smaller than the cost of keeping it active. The connections
22See, for example, Neal (2006) and Heckman and LaFontaine (2010), which document and give context to the
diﬀerences in skills between black and white students.
23Except for a set of parameters of measure 0.
26eﬀect for the green individual is of greater (negative) magnitude, and induces a change on the
incentives of the green community. Note that this eﬀe c ti st h eo p p o s i t ef o rt h eb l u ea g e n tBm:t h e
larger is ∆, the larger is the connections eﬀect with the green community. But, because of mutual
consent, these links cannot be sustained in equilibrium.
It is the mixture between changes in connections eﬀects and mutual consent that changes the
logic of the model when there are heterogeneous externalities. In general, the connections eﬀects
increase for the blue community, but decrease for the green community. This may break mutual
consent in situations where mutual consent would be preserved under homogenous externalities.
Intuitively, as exempliﬁed in the discussion above, this can make it more diﬃcult for the blue
community to assimilate to the green community.
5.2 Social norms
Let us now go back to the model with homogeneous externalities δ but modify the cost of socializa-
tion choices by taking into account social norms. There are studies that illustrate the importance
of social sanctions and social norms in ethnic groups.24 Anson (1985) relates the story of Eddie
Perry, an African-American youth from Harlem, who graduated with honors from Phillips Ex-
eter Academy and won a full four-year fellowship to Stanford. A close mentor of Eddie explained
the psychological tension of coming back home in his own neighborhood: “This kid couldn’t even
play basketball. They ridiculed him for that, they ridiculed him for going away to school, they
ridiculed him for turning white. I know because he told me they did.” (Anson, 1985, p. 205). In
his autobiographical essay, Rodriguez (1982) told us about his own story as a Mexican-American
from Sacramento who went to college and for whom English became his dominant language. His
(extended) family considered him increasingly alien and as he put it: “Pocho,t h e yc a l l e dm e .
Sometimes, playfully, teasingly, using the tender diminutive −mi pochito.S o m e t i m e sn o ts op l a y -
fully, mockingly, Pocho (Rodriguez (1982, p. 29).25 These two stories of a black person labeled a
white man by his black neighbors and an Hispanic labeled a “gringo” by his extended family are
strikingly similar and illustrate the idea of social sanctions and social norms imposed by their own
communities.26
In what follows, we propose a simple way of incorporating these forms of social norms and
sanctions in our model. The two examples mentioned in the previous paragraph share the same
characteristics: an individual of a given community is punished because he is deviating from the
social norms imposed by his community. In other words, social punishments increase when there
24See Akerlof (1997) and references therein.
25As Akerlof (1987) noted it, “a Spanish dictionary deﬁnes the word ‘pocho’ as an adjective meaning ‘colorless’ or
‘bland’. As a noun it means the Mexican-American who, in becoming an American, forgets his native society.
26See also Stack (1976) for an interesting story of social sanctions/norms imposed by two systers on their third
sister who became middle class. Stack explained how the social distance between them increased, especially clear in
the mutual care of their respective children.
27are strong diﬀerences between own exposure rate and the exposure rate of own friends. We can
formalize this idea using a social sanction function that depends on these rates of exposure. The
social sanction individual i receives from her own community is a function of her rate of exposure,
ei, and the average rate of exposure of her friends from her own community, which we denote by












To understand this formula, consider again the network described in Figure 7 and let us calculate















cij − s(ei,ei) (16)




δd(i,j), the total cost of forming direct links with both communities,
X
j∈Ni(g)
cij, and the social sanction imposed on individual i by her community, s(ei,ei).
According to our interpretation, there are several properties this social sanction function should
satisfy:
(i) The social sanction is positive, i.e. s(ei,ei) > 0, only when 0 <e i < ei because, in that case,
individual i spends more time with the other community than the average of her friends from
her own community;
(ii) The social sanction is equal to zero, i.e. s(ei,ei)=0 ,i fei ≥ ei or ei =0 , that is when she
spends either more time with her community than the average of her friends or no time at all
(in which case, no sanction is possible);
(iii) I nt h ec a s ew h e n0 <e i < ei, the social sanction imposed on individual i is higher the larger




(iv) Finally, when 0 <e i < ei,t h ee ﬀect of a decrease in individual i’s rate of exposure is stronger





To ﬁx ideas, consider the following social sanction function:
s(ei,ei)=( ei − ei)21{0<ei<¯ ei}
where 1{0<ei<ei} denotes the indicator function on the set {0 <e i < ¯ ei}. This function satisﬁes
the four above properties since: (i) s(ei,ei)=( ei − ei)2 > 0 when ei < ei; (ii) s(ei,ei)=0when
ei ≥ ¯ ei or ei =0 ; (iii) and (iv) when ei < ei,w eh a v e : 27
∂s(ei,ei)
∂ei




= −2 < 0
In this new scenario, the social sanction function ampliﬁe st h ee x p o s u r ee ﬀects since the social
sanction adds an implicit cost for individual i in case her exposure to the other community is higher
than the exposure of her peers. The direct beneﬁts and cost of a given link are unaﬀected compared
to the initial formulation of the model, which means that the connections eﬀects in the two models
coincide. To understand the consequences of this new term in the utility function, let us analyze
some of the networks we studied before.
Consider , for example, the integrated and segregated networks described in Proposition 1.
The social sanction function s(ei,ei) facilitates the stability of segregated networks. Indeed, when
considering creating a link with the other community, for each individual, independently of her
type, the connections eﬀect is unaﬀected because the externalities and the direct cost of building
a link are the same as in the initial model. The exposure eﬀect is, however, magniﬁed because
creating a bridge link will decrease the exposure rate of each individual involved in the link, which
will be below that of the rest of the community. As a result, because of the social sanction, the
incentives to create an intercommunity link are lowered and the stability of segregated networks is
preserved.
In the analysis of the integrated networks, the social sanction plays a minor role. The social
sanction increases the incentives of keeping links with own community since severing one of these
links would reduce the exposure rate of this individual below the average exposure rate of the rest
of her community, implying a positive social sanction. Given that the connections and exposure
27Economists have modelled conformity in a similar way by adding a term −(ei−ei)
2 to the utility function, where
ei and ei is the eﬀort of individual i and the average eﬀort of i’s peers. In that case, each individual i loses utility
(ei−ei)
2 from failing to conform to her peers (see, among others, Akerlof, 1980; Bernheim, 1994; Kandel and Lazear,
1992; Akerlof, 1997; Fershtman and Weiss, 1998; Patacchini and Zenou, 2011). Our formulation is slightly diﬀerent
since the social cost is only paid when ei < ei.
29eﬀects are the same as in Section 3, this implies that the incentives of keeping an intracommunity
link are higher in this case. On the other hand, when individual i wants to severe a link with
someone from the other community, her incentives are unaﬀected. Indeed, the connections and
exposure eﬀect are exactly the same and the social sanction is zero since, by severing such a link,
her exposure rate becomes higher than that of the rest of her community.
This analysis should make apparent that, in general, social sanctions relax the incentive con-
straints of individuals facing situations where the relation between communities is very homo-
geneous across individuals within the same community. The analysis is quite diﬀerent when we
consider networks where individuals from one community show very asymmetric positions such
as, for example, the blue individual Bm in the network displayed in Figure 7. In that case, the
diﬀerences in terms of exposure rates are large and the social sanction from deviating from the
community’s norm is high. This makes it harder to keep each intercommunity link active, as it is
the case in Figure 7 since severing one of these links would mitigate the strength of the social sanc-
tion. The incentives to socialize with the other community are now very diﬀerent for Bm and the
network described in Figure 7 is probably not stable (the stability would depend on the particular
functional form considered for s(ei,ei)). In this asymmetric network, the social sanction function
strengthens her incentives constraints of socializing with the other community instead of relaxing
them. There is, however, one caveat. The social sanction function s(ei,ei) has a discontinuity at
ei =0 . If we consider the network displayed in Figure 8, the social sanction relaxes the stability
constraints because the blue individual Bm has no connection with her community of origin and
therefore does not suﬀer from any type of social sanction from her community. The incentives to
stay disconnected with her community of origin are strengthened (because the connections and
exposure eﬀects are the same while the social sanction would be very high if building a connection
with the blue community) and the stability constraints for the links with the green community are
unaﬀected because the social sanction would remain equal to 0 in the case of severing any of them.
The discontinuity of s(ei, ¯ ei) plays a leading role in this argument.
In some sense, Eddie Perry and Richard Rodriguez (mentioned above) have both chosen to have
a very low exposure to their own community (i.e. low ei)a n da r ep a y i n gav e r yh i g hp r i c ef o ri t
when interacting with people from their community of origin.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we consider social networks as the main building blocks for individual identity
formation. This is a complementary view from that developed in other research (as, for example, in
Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), where identities are sometimes interpreted as a direct choice and where
it is precisely this unidimensional choice that determines socioeconomic outcomes. The choice of
direct network interactions is, instead, necessarily a multidimensional and complex decision. In
our case, these decentralized linking decisions are the channel determining each individual’s social
30capital. We have modeled these decisions through a precise network structure that shapes social
interactions and the exposure and assimilation of others’ diﬀerences.
Identiﬁcation patterns are important for individual and collective outcomes. Using Swedish
data and focusing on the two-dimensional aspect of identity deﬁned in Figure 1, Nekby and Rödin
(2009) show that what matters for labor market outcomes is the strength of identiﬁcation with
the majority culture regardless of the strength of own ethnic identity. In other words, having
a strong ethnic identity is not necessarily negative for the labor market if it is not associated
with a rejection of the majority culture values. Using the same bidimensional measure of identity,
Zimmermann et al. (2007), Constant and Zimmermann (2008), Constant et al. (2009) ﬁnd that, for
Germany, human capital acquired in origin countries lead to lower identiﬁcation with the majority
culture while education acquired post-migration in the host country does not aﬀect attachment to
the majority culture. Battu and Zenou (2010) ﬁnd similar results for the UK while Bisin et al.
(2011), studying diﬀerent European countries, show that there is a penalty in the labor market for
minorities with a strong identity.
We believe that our model points to an important and still understudied issue in the literature
on economics and identity. In particular, our analysis has been able to mimic some characteristics
of diﬀerent real-world networks, such as the rise of oppositional identity patterns. While the model
is quite stylized, we believe it is helpful because it provides a neat taxonomy of the strategic eﬀects
that are at the root of individual decisions for building connections. The extensions considered in
Section 5 show how these eﬀects would be perturbed when new elements are introduced into the
model.
In what follows, we suggest three avenues for future research that seem particularly promising.
Initial exogenous categories, reﬂected in our model by the initial assignment of one of the two
possible types, are reasonable in some setups. For example, family endows each individual with
some cultural traits, such as inherited language. Yet, in other setups, we expect that both the
initial identity (type) and direct connections (network) are an individual choice. This can be the
case, for example, for adolescent behavior in the classroom.28 It would be interesting to encompass
in a uniﬁed framework both dimensions of choices and to study the interplay of both the individual
and social dimensions in the determination of identity. Presumably, in this richer framework, there
might be complementarities in the ﬁnal strategies of each individual in both dimensions: the choice
in one dimension correlates and ampliﬁes the choice in the other dimension.
From a more technical perspective, it would also be worth studying possible reﬁnements of our
equilibrium concept that could help providing more precise results and a more exhaustive char-
acterization of the set of equilibrium networks. This is going to increase the already important
combinatorial complexity in the analysis, which already deprives us from obtaining a full charac-
28See, for example, Coleman (1961), where a taxonomy of identities that adolescents adopt in US high-schools is
provided, and Akerlof and Kranton (2002), for an economic analysis of identity in schooling.
31terization of pairwise stable networks.
Finally, we have not deepened other important consequence of network structure, such as segre-
gation and inequality. A recent work by Echenique and Fryer (2007) has introduced a new measure
of individual segregation rooted at the social net w o r kl e v e l . T h i sm e a s u r ec o u l db eu s e di no u r
setup to analyze the segregation patterns emerging from decentralized network formation. Kets et
al. (2011) have also proposed an interesting model exploring how the structure of a social network
constrains the level of inequality that can be sustained among its members. In their model, what
inﬂuences inequality is the ability of players to form viable coalitions given an exogenous social
network. It would be interesting to relate network formation and identity considerations to these
relevant issues.
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37APPENDIX A: PROOFS
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .
(i) Complete integration between communities: There is no gain in utility for a green person to
sever a link with a blue person, who is necessarily connected to the rest of the blue community, if:




























The ﬁrst term δ−δ2 are the beneﬁts derived from externalities of having a direct connection instead









cost of forming the link with this blue person. The sum of these two ﬁrst terms is what we refer in



















is the indirect beneﬁt derived from the diminishing costs of maintaining a link with a blue person,
once this new link is formed. Before forming the new link, the proportion of green friends among
all green person’s friends is nG−1
n−3 . Once the new link is created, this proportion diminishes to nG−1
n−2 ,

















C. The third term in (17) accounts for this diﬀerence
in costs and was referred to as the exposure eﬀect in the main text.
The inequality (17) is equivalent to







nB − n +2
(n − 3)(n − 2)
¸
C
which is always true since by assumption n ≥ nB +2, which implies that the term in the right hand
side of this last expression is negative, and δ − δ2 − c>0 by assumption. Because of symmetry, a
similar argument can be used to guarantee that no gain in utility can be found for a blue person
that severs a link with a green person.
We have now to check that there is no gain in utility for a green person to sever a link with
another green person. The relevant inequality to make sure that a green individual does not have
such incentives is:
δ − δ2 − c (18)
29The n − 2 in the denominators come from the fact we are including the individuals involved in the link in the


















The strength of the connections eﬀect is now equal to δ − δ2 − c because we are considering an
intracommunity link and, hence, its cost is equal to c. When a green agents severs a link with
another green individual, she is reducing her exposure to her own community and this diminishes
the cost of each of the links with the other community. This exposure eﬀect is measured by the
term in the second line of (18). This term is negative, meaning that severing a link decreases the
intracommunity costs. Inequality (18) is equivalent to
C ≤
(n − 2)
2 (n − 3)
nB (nB − 1)
2
¡
δ − δ2 − c
¢
An equivalent argument shows that a blue individual does not want to sever a link with another
blue individual if and only if
C ≤
(n − 2)
2 (n − 3)
nG (nG − 1)
2
¡
δ − δ2 − c
¢
Since nG ≥ nB, this last inequality is the condition that ensures that no individual has incentives
to sever a link with her own community.
(ii) Let us show that complete segregation between communities is an equilibrium network.
There is no gain in utility for a green person to establish a link with a blue person, who is necessarily






Similarly, there is no gain in utility for a blue person to connect to a green individual, who is






Since nG ≥ nB, and because mutual consent is necessary, then condition (6) guarantees that there
is complete segregation.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
(i) Let us denote by G1 (resp. B1) the unique green (resp. unique blue) agent involved in the





δ2 − c>C (19)





δ2 − c>C (20)
39Since nG ≥ nB,t h eﬁrst condition is more restrictive than the second. Mutual consent in link
formation imposes that both conditions have to be satisﬁed at the same time, hence (19) is a
requirement for the network to be pairwise stable.
Under assumption (4), we know that both communities are fully intraconnected. We have to
check that no other pair of agents of distinct types other than G1 and B1 have incentives to form
al i n k .
The green agent G1 does not have incentives to form a link with a blue one who is not B1 iﬀ





















δ − δ2 − c
¢
<C (21)
The blue agent B1 does not have incentives to form a link with a green agent who is not G1 iﬀ





















δ − δ2 − c
¢
<C (22)
Because of mutual consent and since nG ≥ nB only condition (21) is required.
































Because of symmetry, any other blue agent diﬀerent than B1 does not have incentives to form a















Finally, any green agent other than G1 does not have incentives to form a link with a blue other
than B1 iﬀ















δ3 − c<C (25)
40Any blue agent other than B1 does not have incentives to form a link with a green diﬀerent than
G1 iﬀ















δ3 − c<C (26)
Because of mutual consent, only one of the conditions among (25) and (26) has to hold. Observe
that if either (23) or (24) holds, then either (25) or (26) hold too.
Note that since δ>δ 2+c, no green or blue individual diﬀerent than G1 or B1 has incentives to
sever a link with her own community. In this case, there is no exposure eﬀect to consider because
such individuals have no ties with the other community.
Gathering everything together the required conditions for the network to be pairwise stable are
given by (19), (21), (23) and (24).
(ii) In this network, a green agent with a bridge link does not have incentives to sever it iﬀ
δ − δ3 − c>C (27)
Because of symmetry, this same condition ensures that a blue agent with a bridge link does not
have incentives to sever it.
A green agent that has already one bridge link does not have incentives to build a new one iﬀ
















which is equivalent to
nGnB
(nG − 1)(nB − 1) − nB
¡
δ − δ2 − c
¢
<C (28)
Similarly, a blue agent does not have incentives to build a new bridge link with a green that
has already a bridge link iﬀ
∙
nGnB
(nG − 1)(nB − 1) − nG
¸¡
δ − δ2 − c
¢
<C (29)
Because of mutual consent, only (28) or (29) is needed. Since the ﬁrst of these conditions is less
restrictive, it suﬃces to ensure that this type of link is not formed.
Furthermore, a blue agent with a bridge link does not have incentives to build a link with a
green that does not have a bridge link iﬀ
















δ − δ2 − c
¢
<C (30)





δ − δ2 − c
¢
<C (31)
Because of mutual consent, only (30) or (31) is needed. since the second of these conditions is
less restrictive, it suﬃces to ensure that this type of link is not formed.
Since
nGnB






+ nGnB >n B ⇔ nB + nG > 1
condition (28) implies (30).
Finally, note that, as in the previous section, the green individuals that do not have any bridge
link with the other community do not have incentives to sever any of their links with their commu-
nity. Similarly, the rest of green and blue individuals, which have one bridge link, have no incentives
to sever an intracommunity link because this has no eﬀect in the cost of their bridge link. This is
because their exposure rate in the computation of the cost of the bridge link, which is equal to 1 for
both sides of the link, is not aﬀected if intracommunity link is severed. This is a general rule that
we use in subsequent proofs: when an individual has at most one bridge link, severing or creating
intracommunity links generates no exposure eﬀect.
Hence, gathering everything together we obtain that the two required conditions are (27) and
(28).
(iii) We call “oppositional blue” and denote her by Bm, the blue agent that has a bridge link
with each of the members of the green community. The oppositional blue individual Bm does not
want to sever any of her bridge links iﬀ





























(n − 3)(n − 2)
C>0
which is equivalent to
(n − 2)(n − 3)
(nB − 1)(nB − 2)
¡
δ − δ2 − c
¢
>C (32)
A green agent does not want to sever his bridge link with the oppositional blue Bm iﬀ


























42Any of the non-oppositional blues, denoted by B0, does not have incentives to directly connect with
a green agent iﬀ










δ − δ2 − c
¤
<C (34)
A green agent does not have incentives to connect with a non-oppositional blue B0 iﬀ

































which is equivalent to












The conditions (32) and (33) have to hold. Because of mutual consent, only one of the conditions
(34) and (35) is required. Condition (34) is less restrictive than the last one, and hence, the set of
required conditions are (32), (33) and (34), that need to hold at the same time.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Consider the network described in Figure 8. There are nG individuals who are all connected
with each other. There is one blue Bm who is connected to all greens and is not connected to any
other blue B0. All the other nB − 1 blues are fully connected with each other.
The blue individual Bm does not want to create a link with a blue individual B0 iﬀ












































which is equivalent to
c<δ− δ2
This is always true because of assumption (4).
43Observe that, because of (4), none of the blues B0 w o u l dl i k et os e v e ral i n kw i t haB0. Because
of mutual consent, when condition (9) holds, they cannot have a link with Bm because Bm does
n o tw a n tt o .
A green will not sever a link with Bm iﬀ
δ − c>δ 2
which always true because of (4).
Finally, because of (4), it follows that a green does not want to sever a link with another green.
This is again, as in the case of the Proof of Proposition 2 ii) because for green agents there is no
exposure eﬀect to consider since in the network conﬁguration we are analyzing they have only one
bridge link with the blue community.
Therefore, condition (9) is enough to guarantee that the network described by Figure 8 is
pairwise stable.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
A green agent does not have incentives to sever a link with a blue agent whenever
δ − δ3 − c ≥ 0,
which is immediately satisﬁed when c<δ− δ2.
On the other hand, a green agent does not have incentives to create a link with another green
agent if







This condition is satisﬁed if C is high enough.
A similar argument holds for a blue agent.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
(i) The center in the star formed by the green community (that we call the “green center”) does













Because of mutual consent, only the ﬁrst one, that coincides with (11), needs to hold
44If the centers have no incentive to connect with each other, af o r t i o r ino individual of one







then neither the green center nor the blue center has incentives to sever the bridge link that connects
them.
Furthermore, none of the centers has incentives to sever a link with her own community because
they have just one bridge link with the other community, and we can once more apply the result
that there is no exposure eﬀect in this case.





δ − δ2 − c
¢
<C
Observe that this is satisﬁed by assumption.
Similarly, the blue center does not have incentives to connect with a peripheral agent of the




δ − δ2 − c
¢
<C
Again, this condition is trivially satisﬁed.
Since these last two conditions ensure that none of the centers have incentives to form a link with
the periphery of the other community, and since mutual consent is necessary for link formation, we
don’t have to check for the conditions that ensure that a peripheral agent does not have incentives
to connect with the center of the other community.




Because of symmetry, this same condition ensures that a blue peripheral agent does not have




δ2 − c>C ,ensure that the network analyzed is stable.
(iii) A green peripheral agent does not have incentives to sever his bridge link with a blue
peripheral iﬀ
δ − δ5 + δ2 − δ4 − c>C (36)
This same condition ensures that a blue peripheral agent does not have incentives to sever his
bridge link with a green peripheral agent.
A green peripheral agent does not have incentives to form a link with another green peripheral
agent iﬀ
δ − δ3 <c (37)
45and this same condition ensures that a blue peripheral agent does not have incentives to form a
link with another blue peripheral agent.
Following the same logic as in previous proofs, since each peripheral agent has one and only
o n eb r i d g el i n k ,t h e r ei sn oe x p o s u r ee ﬀect and none of these individuals has icnentives to sever the
link with the center in their community.
The green center does not have incentives to form a link with the blue center iﬀ
δ − δ3 − c<C (38)
Because of symmetry, this same condition ensures that the blue center does not have incentives to
f o r mal i n kw i t ht h eg r e e nc e n t e r .
Observe that if (37) then (38) immediately follows.
The green center does not have incentives to form a link with a blue peripheral agent iﬀ
δ − δ2 − c<C
that holds by assumption. And this same condition ensures that the blue center does not have
incentives to form a link with a green peripheral agent. Hence, because of mutual consent in link
formation, we can ensure that no bridge link between the center of one community and a peripheral
agent of the other is worth oﬀ.
A green peripheral agent does not have incentives to form a bridge link with another blue
peripheral agent iﬀ














and, once more because of symmetry, this same condition ensures that a blue peripheral does not
have incentives to form a bridge link with another green peripheral agent.
Hence, the required conditions are (36), (37) and (39).
(iv) Firstly, the two centers don’t have incentives to sever the bridge link that connects them
iﬀ
δ − δ3 − c>C (40)
A blue peripheral individual does not have incentives to sever the link with a green peripheral one
iﬀ




















which is equivalent to
δ − δ3 − c>0
which trivially holds if (40) holds too. The same argument holds to show that a green peripheral
individual does not have incentives to sever the link with a blue peripheral one.
46A peripheral blue individual does not have incentives to form a link with the center of the other
community iﬀ






































which is a condition that is trivially satisﬁed given the assumption that c>δ− δ2 and that the
right hand side of this last inequality is strictly positive. An equivalent argument is valid for the
incentives of a peripheral green not willing to form a link with the blue center. Hence, because of
mutual consent, we do not have to check for the condition of a center of one of the communities
not willing to form a link with a peripheral agent of the other community.
A peripheral agent does not have incentives to build a link with another peripheral of his own
community because the direct beneﬁt of this connection would be
δ − δ2 − c<0
and it would imply higher costs for the connections with the other community.
Finally, a peripheral blue has no incentives to sever the link with the blue center if
Hence, only the ﬁrst of the inequalities, δ−δ3−c>C , is required for that network to be stable.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6



































































It is easy to check that 1 > n
2nGnB and, hence, that the upper bound is strictly positive.
47For C large enough, segregation dominates integration. What happens when C is smaller?




δ2 − c, and see if integration dominates




































































































































which is equivalent to (15).
48P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7( f r o mA p p e n d i xB )
(i) Let us ﬁrst show that complete integration between communities is always an equilibrium
network. There is no gain in utility for a green person to sever a link with a blue person, who is
necessarily connected to the rest of the blue community, if:






























The ﬁrst term δ−δ2 are the beneﬁts derived from externalities of having a direct connection instead











is the cost of forming the link with this blue person. Observe that, before forming the link, the
proportion of green friends among all green person’s friends is nG−1
n−2 , while the proportion of blue
friends among all blue person’s friends is nB−1



















is the indirect beneﬁt derived from the diminishing costs of maintaining a link with a blue person,
once this new link is formed. Before forming the new link, the proportion of green friends among
all green person’s friends is nG−1
n−3 . Once the new link is created, this proportion diminishes to nG−1
n−2 ,

















C. The third term in (42) accounts for this diﬀerence
in costs.
The inequality (42) is equivalent to


























(n − 3)(n − 2)
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Similarly, because of symmetry, the condition that guarantees that there is no g a i ni nu t i l i t yf o ra
blue person to sever a link with a green person is














49w h i c hi sa l w a y st r u ei f( 4 5 )i ss a t i s ﬁed. As a result, complete integration between communities is
always an equilibrium network if (45) is satisﬁed.
(ii) Let us show that complete segregation between communities is an equilibrium network.
There is no gain in utility for a green person to establish a link with a blue person, who is necessarily








Similarly, there is no gain in utility for a blue person to connect to a green individual, who is





δ2 − c<(1 + k)C
Since nG ≥ nB, and because mutual consent is necessary, then condition (6) guarantees that there
is complete segregation.
(iii) Let us ﬁnd the condition that guarantees that there are no equilibrium for which each
community is not fully connected. For that, we take the worst case scenario. The smallest beneﬁt
ab l u ep e r s o nc a no b t a i nb ym a k i n gal i n kt oa n o t h e rb l u ei sδ − δ2. The highest cost for a blue i
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nG + b +1
= −
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nG + b +1
¸
⇔ b =0
This implies that the worst case scenario is
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51APPENDIX B: Oppositional identities when intercommunity costs are always larger.
In the previous section, we found that bi-partite networks were pairwise stable because there
were no costs of becoming “green” for a blue person. In the equilibrium network described in Figure
8, the blue Bm “becomes” a green for other greens since the cost of interacting with her is just c.
This is due to our assumption on the cost function which stipulates that the intercommunity cost
is equal to the intracommunity cost as soon as one of the persons involved in the relationship has
no friends of the same type. In the present section, we relax this assumption and assume instead
the following intercommunity cost function for τ(i) 6= τ(j):









where 0 <k<1 (we still assume that cij = c if τ(i)=τ(j)). With this new intercommunity cost
function, a blue person can never become totally “green” for other greens because even if she has
no blue friends, i.e. e
τ(i)
i =0 , the cost of interacting with greens is c+kC, which is strictly greater
than c, the cost for a green of interacting with other greens.





δ − δ2 − c
¢
nG (44)
holds, then any equilibrium network is such that each community is fully connected. In particular,



















hold, then both the network for which the blue and green communities are totally integrated and
the one for which the blue and green communities are completely segregated are equilibrium
networks.
When the intercommunity cost function is given by (43), then each community forms a complete
network is C is not too large. In that case, no bipartite network can emerge. This is because nobody
can now become “like” someone from the other type and, therefore, the attractiveness of having
only friends from the other community is much lower. Interestingly, when k i sn o tt o ol a r g ea n d
C high enough, each individual can either have links with all individuals (including those from
the other community) or only links with her own community. Indeed, once the network is totally
integrated, then nobody wants to delete a link because the gain is too low compared to the costs
(this is because k is low enough). When the network is completely segregated, then because C is
high enough, no individual wants to form a link with someone from the other community.
52